ABSTRACT. This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of the Owen set of transportation games. In the characterization we use six properties including consistency (CONS2) and splitting and merging (SM) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper.
In transportation situations, how to obtain the optimal solution for a single decision-maker is well known but a new problem arises when the agents involved cooperate and they have to distribute the obtained profit or saving among each other. In the cooperative game theory literature, we can find many general procedures (solution concepts) for distributing the total amount obtained by a set of agents among each other. In order to select the most suitable procedure of distribution or allocation, it is usual to characterize the solution concepts through different sets of properties. Nowadays, many operations research problems are studied from a game theoretical point of view introducing the very realistic multiple agents component in the analysis of such problems. For a survey on this interesting topic see Borm et al. (2002) . In particular, transportation situations are studied from a game theoretical point of view in Samet et al. (1984) , Sa´nchez-Soriano (1998) and Sa´nchez-Soriano et al. (2001) among others.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate certain aspects of transportation games and give an axiomatic characterization of its Owen set (a solution concept related to the dual optimal solutions of the transportation problem). To achieve this objective, we look at two operations research problems closely Theory and Decision 56: 215-228, 2004 . Ó 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. related to transportation situations: assignment situations and linear production situations. Assignment situations and linear production situations were studied from a game theoretical point of view in Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Owen (1975) respectively. A very interesting property in assignment games is that the core and the Owen set of the game coincide. This fact does not occur in linear production situations and transportation situations. Sasaki (1995) provided two characterizations of the core of assignment games and hence of its Owen set, and van Gellekom et al. (2000) provided a characterization of the Owen set of linear production games. Transportation situations occupy an intermediate position in between assignment and linear production situations because assignment situations are a special case of transportation situations and these can be rewritten as linear production situations. This particular position and relationship make us look into the properties used to characterize the Owen set of assignment games and linear production games to find the set of properties that characterize the Owen set of transportation games. This paper consists of three sections. In the next section we present the most relevant definitions and results for the transportation situations and related games. We study the properties of the Owen set in Section 3. We consider two types of properties which are related to those introduced by Sasaki (1995) to characterize the core of assignment games, and by van Gellekom et al. (2000) to characterize the Owen set of linear production games. In the final section, we provide a characterization of the Owen set in transportation situations.
TRANSPORTATION SITUATIONS AND GAMES
A transportation situation is determined by a tuple T ¼ ðP; Q; B; p; qÞ, where P and Q are, respectively, the sets of supply points and demand points. The transport of one unit of the goods from supply point i to demand point j generates a non-negative profit of b ij . The matrix B ¼ ½b ij i2P;j2Q contains all the profits per unit of the goods. The supply at point i 2 P equals p i units of the goods and the demand j 2 Q is q j units where both p i and q j are non-negative integers. The vectors p ¼ ðp i Þ i2P and q ¼ ðq j Þ j2Q contain, respectively, the supplies and demands of the goods. The set of transportation situations is denoted by G T . A transportation plan for T 2 G T is a matrix l ¼ ½l ij i2P;j2Q where l ij ! 0 is the number of units of the goods that will be transported from supply point i to demand point j. A supply point i 2 P can supply at most p i units of the goods, and a demand point j 2 Q wants to receive at most q j . The maximal profit that can be obtained in this situation is max X ði;jÞ2PÂQ b ij l ij jl is a transportation plan A transportation plan l is also called a feasible solution for the above transportation program T. We denote by O p ðTÞ the set of optimal solutions for this program. Our interest is how to distribute the total profit among the agents when they cooperate, i.e., to propose a vector ðx; yÞ 2 <
where l Ã ‰ O p ðTÞ. A well-known approach to distribute the total profit is to define a game for each transportation situation. Given T 2 G T , the corresponding transportation game (N; w) is a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game with player set N ¼ P [ Q. Let S & N; S 6 ¼ £, be a coalition of players and define P S ¼ P \ S and Q S ¼ Q \ S. If S ¼ P S or S ¼ Q S , there are either only suppliers or demanders present, then no transport can take place and the worth wðSÞ of coalition S equals zero. Otherwise, the worth wðSÞ depends upon the transportation plans for this coalition. A transportation plan lðSÞ for coalition S is a transportation plan for the transportation problem T S ¼ P S ; ð Q S ;½b ij i2P S ;j2Q S ; ðp i Þ i2P S ; ðq j Þ j2Q S Þ. By convention wð£Þ ¼ 0. Now, when thinking about how to share the profit among the suppliers and the demanders, one can consider sharing it according to some game theoretic solution concept for TUgames. For instance, one way is to do so according to an element in the core of the transportation game (N; w), i.e.,
y j ¼ wðNÞ and
If a core-element is proposed as a distribution of the total profit wðNÞ, then each coalition S will get at least as much as it can obtain on its own, therefore no coalition has an incentive to split off. The transportation games have non-empty core and are superadditive but not convex. Thus, for an arbitrary transportation game we can always select a core element, but with great difficulty. Owen (1975) introduced the class of linear production games and presented a method to find a non-empty subset of the core of these games. Since a transportation game can be seen as a special case of linear production games, we can use this method to derive core elements. This set is the so-called Owen set of the transportation situation, which is defined by
with ðu; vÞ 2 O d ðTÞ
where O d ðTÞ is the set of optimal solutions of the dual program of the (relaxed) transportation program for the grand coalition, i.e.,
Note that each element u i ; i 2 P; v j ; j 2 Q, of a vector ðu; vÞ 2 O d ðTÞ is the mean profit that an agent will obtain per unit from the supply or demand. Therefore, an element ðp i u i ; q j v j Þ i2P;j2Q of the Owen set is a vector of profits that players receive from the supply or demand. Assignment situations are a special case of transportation situations when all supplies p i ; i 2 P, and demands q j ; j 2 Q, equal 1. Hence, an assignment situation can be represented as A ¼ ðP; Q; BÞ. Assignment games were introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972) . They proved that the core of an assignment game is the non-empty set of optimal solutions of the dual program of the (relaxed) assignment program for the grand coalition, i.e., CðwÞ ¼ O d ðAÞ ¼ OwenðAÞ. In the sequel, we will denote the set of assignment situations by G A and the core of the assignment game CðwÞ by CðAÞ.
In general, the Owen set does not coincide with the core of a transportation game. See Sa´nchez-Soriano et al. (2001) for a detailed analysis of the relationship between the core and the Owen set of a transportation situation.
A solution concept W on G T is a map, which assigns to every T ¼ ðP; Q; B; p; qÞ 2 G T a non-empty set of available distributions Ø 6 ¼ WðTÞ & < P Â < Q :
PROPERTIES
This section is devoted to the properties of the Owen set. We begin with those properties which are common to general games, or, at least to two-sided market games. We end up with the definition of two new properties which are related to those introduced by Sasaki (1995) to characterize the core of assignment games, and by van Gellekom et al. (2000) to characterize the Owen set of linear production games. 
ðx; yÞ.
Then, it follows from condition (ii) that
Let ðu; vÞ given by u i ¼ x i =p i ; 8i 2 P, and v j ¼ y j =q j ; 8j 2 Q. We will show that ðu; vÞ 2 O d ðTÞ. Now, in order to prove the optimality of ðu; vÞ, we will find a feasible solution l for the transportation program T (i.e. l 2 F p ðTÞ) with the same value for the objective function.
Since
Note that the feasible set F p ðT k Þ ¼ F p ðTÞ, for all k 2 N, and F p ðTÞ is compact. Then, the sequence fl k g k2N & F p ðTÞ has a convergent subsequence fl k k g k2N . Let l 0 2 F p ðTÞ its limit, then on the one hand
On the other hand,
Thus, from (3) and (4) The following property was introduced by Sasaki (1995) to characterize the core on assignment problems. Since the core coincides with the Owen set in the assignment problems, we will look at it in order to define a new consistency property for transportation situations. Then, we will use this new consistency to characterize the Owen set.
DEFINITION 2. A solution U on G
A satisfies consistency (CONS), if for all A ¼ ðP; Q; BÞ 2 G A , for all ðx; yÞ 2 UðAÞ and for all ðP; QÞ & ðP; QÞ, such that there exists a feasible assignment l 2 F p ðAÞ with (i) xðPÞ þ yðQÞ ¼ P ði;jÞ2PÂQ b ij l ij , (ii) l ij ¼ 0, for all pair ði; jÞ 2 ðPnPÞ Â Q or ði; jÞ 2 P Â ðQnQÞ,
it follows that ðxj P ; yj Q Þ 2 UðP; Q; Bj P[Q Þ.
The following theorem can be found in Sasaki (1995 Clearly, ðuj P ; vj Q Þ belongs to
The following lemma will be useful in the axiomatic characterization of the Owen set. LEMMA 1. Let W a solution on G T satisfying (EFF) and (CONS2). Then W satisfies (CONS) on G A .
Proof. Let
A ¼ ðP; Q; BÞ 2 G A , ðx; yÞ 2 WðAÞ and ðP; QÞ & ðP; QÞ satisfying the conditions in Definition 2. By efficiency and condition (i), the matching l is an optimal assignment for A. And hence, by condition (ii), the matching lj PÂQ is an optimal assignment for Aj P[Q . Therefore, by condition (iii), it is satisfied that X i2P
Since W satisfies (CONS2), it follows that ðxj P ; yj Q Þ 2 WðP; Q;
To each transportation situation T ¼ ðP; Q; B; p; qÞ 2 G T a representatives assignment situation A T ¼ ðP
can be associated by splitting every supply point i 2 P into p i supplier representatives and every demand point j 2 Q into q j demander representatives. In this way, we will have a set of suppliers P T ¼ fðirÞ; i 2 P; 1 r p i g and another set Q T ¼ fðjcÞ;j 2 Q; 1 c q j g of demanders. The profit generated by matching a supplier (ir) and a demander (jc) is b T ir;jc :¼ b ij . Clearly, the corresponding operations research problems in both situations are equivalent, as are the optimal solutions.
The following property adapts the property of shuffle (van Gellekom et al., 2000) to the context of transportation situations. Note that our property is much less restrictive. We restrict ourselves to integer divisions and unions and we do not ask for permutation invariance. In our context, the following property can be interpreted in terms of a non-manipulability condition. 
WðA T Þ, then the distribution ðx; yÞ 2 WðTÞ, where
Proof. We begin by proving the splitting part. We outline the proof as follows. Let T 2 G T and ðx; yÞ 2 OwenðTÞ, then there exists ðu; vÞ 2 O d ðTÞ such that x i ¼ p i u i , for all i 2 P, and y j ¼ q j v j , 8j 2 Q. Now, we offer an axiomatization involving the properties analyzed in the previous section. We will show that the set of axioms we have considered are logically independent.
Let
THEOREM 2. There is a unique solution on G T that satisfies (EFF), (IR), (CONS2), (CR), (SM), and (CONT), and it is the Owen set.
Proof. Let W solution on G T that satisfies (EFF), (IR), (CONS2), (CR), (SM), and (CONT).
First, we will prove that W & OwenðÁÞ. Let T 2 G T , and ðx; yÞ 2 WðTÞ. Since W satisfies (SM), then it follows from the splitting condition that
for some ðx 
On the other hand, because W satisfies (CR),
Then, it follows from (7) and (8) that ðx satisfies all axioms except individual rationality. Note that the non-negativity condition of the dual program has been ignored, whereas the efficiency condition and couple rationality have been imposed. With respect to consistency, continuity and splitting and merging, the argument is similar to that W 1 considered above, taking into account that efficiency for coalition S is a necessary condition to ask for consistency.
( q CR) The solution concept on G T , W 3 , defined as satisfies all axioms except couple rationality, since the inequalities u i þ v j ! b ij , i 2 P; j 2 Q of the dual program have been ignored, whereas the efficiency condition and individual rationality have been imposed. With respect to consistency, continuity and splitting and merging, the argument is similar to that of W 2 considered above. ðT S Þ ¼ fð10; 0Þg. ( q SM) If we remove the splitting and merging property then the core satisfies the remaining properties. We refer to Sa´nchez-Soriano (1998) for a proof of the continuity.
( q CONT) If we eliminate continuity a solution concept which chooses the relative interior of the Owen set invalidates the result.
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